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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-2929

THOMAS A. MURPHY,
Appellant
v.
BANCROFT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-00453)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 4, 2005
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed May 5, 2005)

OPINION

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Plaintiff Thomas Murphy appeals the District Court’s judgment in favor of
defendant Bancroft Construction Company (“Bancroft”). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.

I.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332

and 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because this appeal implicates three orders entered at different stages in the
proceedings, it involves three standards of review. First, the District Court granted
Bancroft’s motion for judgment as to Murphy’s claim under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. Our Court’s review of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is
plenary. Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002). Like the District Court, we
“view the facts alleged in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” and the motion should not be granted “unless the
moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve, and that it is
entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.” Id.
Second, the District Court entered summary judgment against Murphy on his
claims under Delaware law. We “exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of
summary judgment and apply the same standard as the district court, i.e., whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the plaintiff.” Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003).
Third, in a motion for reconsideration, Murphy sought to assert an age
discrimination claim. Plenary review also extends to any legal conclusion underlying the
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District Court’s decision to deny a motion for reconsideration, though the decision on the
motion lies within the sound discretion of the Court. See Le v. Univ. of Pa., 321 F.3d
403, 405-06 (3d Cir. 2003).
II.

Analysis
Because we write solely for the parties, we do not recite the facts underlying

Murphy’s claims or the case’s procedural history. He has raised four issues on appeal,
and we address each in turn.
A.
Murphy alleges that he was discharged by his employer because of his efforts to
divulge Bancroft’s wrongful actions, including, inter alia, Bancroft’s alleged overcharges
and fraudulent billing practices in connection with a construction project for the Capital
School District (“District”). Although under the employment at-will doctrine an at-will
employee like Murphy may be dismissed at any time without cause, Delaware courts
recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as tempering this general
doctrinal rule. See Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 401 (Del. 2000). Murphy argues that
his discharge was in retaliation for his “whistleblowing” actions, rendering his discharge
a violation of public policy, and thus neither in good faith nor fair.
Much of Murphy’s argument is aimed at establishing that Bancroft was involved in
illegal activities. These arguments are unpersuasive because, among other reasons, they
are not supported by the results of audits—initiated after Murphy’s discharge—by the
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Office of Auditor of Accounts for the State of Delaware and the Delaware Department of
Justice. Further, Murphy’s complaints appear to have been aimed at Bancroft’s internal
business practices, which, absent illegality, generally fail to implicate the type of public
interest required for his claim to succeed. See E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v.
Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996).
Moreover, Murphy’s allegations with respect to his purported whistleblowing
activities are insufficient to establish that he was discharged because of those activities.
Murphy’s comments to one of the members of the District’s board did not specify
wrongdoing, but instead urged that a board member “keep asking questions.” Although
he may have made more specific allegations of wrongdoing to an attorney who
represented the District in contract negotiations with Bancroft, Murphy has not pointed to
any evidence that Bancroft was aware of his discussions with the attorney.
In view of these factual deficiencies and the narrowness of the exceptions to the
employment at-will doctrine, the District Court did not err in entering summary judgment
against Murphy on his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 334 (3d Cir. 2003)
(explaining that Delaware courts have been reluctant to recognize a broad application of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing out of concern that the covenant
“could swallow the doctrine of employment at will”); Lord, 748 A.2d at 401-03
(discussing exceptions to at-will employment doctrine as “narrow and discrete” and
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interpreting them to “prevent further erosion” of the doctrine).
B.
Murphy argues that two Bancroft employees made comments to the District’s
board that resulted in the District hiring another individual for a construction management
position. This, he alleges, is intentional interference with a prospective business
relationship. To prevail under Delaware law, Murphy must show: (1) the reasonable
probability of a business opportunity; (2) Bancroft’s intentional interference with that
opportunity; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damages. DeBonaventura v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 428 A.2d 1151, 1153 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981).
Looking to the first element, as the District Court explains, Murphy did not receive
an offer of employment from the District. Instead, he was involved in “informal
conversations” with the District’s superintendent and the president of the District’s school
board. Neither testified that assurances were given to Murphy that he would be hired,
which in any event could only have occurred after public announcement and a formal
application process. In addition, there is no indication in the record that the other
members of the District’s board were inclined to hire Murphy. Thus the District Court
did not err in concluding that Murphy could not have had a reasonable expectation of
employment; hence the first element was not satisfied. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780
A.2d 1075, 1099 (Del. 2001) (describing the first element of the tort of intentional
interference as involving a reasonable expectation of receiving a tangible benefit).
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C.
As the District Court explained in ruling on Bancroft’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Murphy’s complaint failed to indicate what section of RICO Bancroft
allegedly violated. The Court also explained that even if Murphy’s pleading deficiencies
with respect to the RICO allegations could be overcome in an amended complaint, his
claim would still require dismissal because it was based on non-cognizable injuries.
In alleging damages, Murphy has taken the position that he was injured in his
capacity to work as a result of Bancroft’s actions. He argues he is not attempting to
recover for his emotional pain, but rather is seeking to recover his losses to his earning
capacity caused by his depression. Moreover, Murphy submits that at trial he would
attempt to connect his depression to Bancroft’s wrongful acts.
RICO creates a civil cause of action for “any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). “In ordinary
usage, ‘injury to business or property’ does not denote physical or emotional harm to a
person. Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that Congress’s limitation of recovery to
business or property injury ‘retains restrictive significance. It would for example exclude
personal injuries suffered.’” Genty v. RTC, 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis
in original) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). Murphy
attempts to evade this problem by asserting that many personal injuries are accompanied
by lost earning capacity. However, he cites no authority and concedes this suggested path
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is “somewhat novel.” Murphy’s argument hardly persuades, thus rendering his RICO
claim untenable and warranting judgment on the pleadings with respect to this claim.
D.
Murphy waited until after the District Court had granted Bancroft’s motion for
summary judgment on his state law claims (and well after the Court had granted the
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the RICO claim) to seek to assert an age
discrimination claim, notwithstanding the fact that—as the Court indicated—he could
have sought to add the age discrimination claim to this action as early as August 2002.
Murphy argues that the District Court’s denial of his request for leave to amend (raised in
his motion for reconsideration) rested on an erroneous conclusion that he was precluded
from raising this claim.
The doctrine of claim preclusion is central to a court’s objective of conclusive
resolution of disputes and seeks to avoid the expense and vexation of multiple lawsuits
while conserving judicial resources and fostering reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm’n v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). More
simply, its purpose is to avoid piecemeal litigation of claims arising from the same events.
Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, where there is “no
escaping from the fact that [a plaintiff] has relied on different legal theories to seek
redress from the [same defendant] for a single course of wrongful conduct . . . [by]
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splitting a cause of action,” the doctrine of claim preclusion will prohibit the prosecution
of the second lawsuit. Id. at 195.
The District Court properly applied that doctrine here. The assertions Murphy
sought to raise in an amended complaint involve the same facts and the same parties as
those in his initial complaint. Moreover, raising a new legal theory does not make the
second case different for purposes of claim preclusion. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 195
(explaining that where new allegations are made, but the thrust of the two complaints
remains practically identical, claim preclusion applies); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of
Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that claim preclusion prohibits
reexamination not only of matters actually decided in a prior case, but also those that
parties might have, but did not, assert in that action). Murphy’s age discrimination claim
focused on an allegedly age-hostile comment that he first complained of in November
2001 in connection with his separation from his employer—the same separation that has
been the focus of the suit before us. Furthermore, Murphy’s initial complaint included
allegations that he was subjected to “age-disparaging” remarks and harassment.

In these

circumstances, the District Court hardly erred by applying the doctrine of claim
preclusion to deny Murphy’s request for leave to amend his complaint to add an age
discrimination claim.
* * * * *
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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